Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards used a United Arab Emirates-based procurement network to secretly acquire advanced Chinese satellite communication equipment linked to Tehran’s drone and missile programme, according to leaked commercial and shipping records reviewed by the Financial Times.
The revelations expose how a company operating from the UAE helped supply sensitive communications technology to the same branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that later launched a massive barrage of drones and missiles at the Gulf state during Iran’s retaliation against US-Israeli strikes. The documents also shed light on the sophisticated methods used to conceal the shipment’s final destination and bypass scrutiny despite years of Western sanctions targeting Iran’s military procurement apparatus.
The records show that in late 2025, the IRGC Aerospace Force obtained military-grade Chinese satellite antenna equipment through Telesun, a company based in the emirate of Ras al Khaimah. The equipment, manufactured in China, was shipped from Shanghai and routed through Dubai’s Jebel Ali container port before eventually reaching Iran.
The UAE later became one of the principal targets of Iran’s retaliatory campaign following the US-Israeli assault on Iranian assets. Tehran launched more than 2,800 drones and missiles at the Gulf state, including strikes on civilian locations, according to the report.
The disclosures are particularly sensitive given Abu Dhabi’s traditionally hardline posture towards Tehran. Yet despite political tensions, the UAE has long remained a crucial commercial hub for Iranian businesses operating offshore. Analysts have repeatedly warned that the country’s sprawling free trade zones, where oversight can be weaker, create opportunities for sanctions evasion and illicit procurement networks.
According to invoices, customs declarations, packing lists and freight records seen by the FT, Telesun arranged for the delivery of a 4.5 metre motorised satellite antenna produced by Chinese manufacturer StarWin. The consignment, weighing nearly 1.8 tonnes, was described in customs records as “antenna and accessories”.
The equipment was initially transported aboard the Chinese container ship Zhong Gu Yin Chuan from Shanghai to Dubai’s Jebel Ali Container Terminal 1. Shipping records reviewed by the newspaper showed the vessel arrived in Dubai on August 28, where it unloaded a container later collected by an Iranian vessel named Rama III.
Documents indicate Rama III docked at the same quayside on November 23 before departing a day later carrying the shipment towards Iran.
However, an FT analysis of maritime GPS data and satellite imagery suggests the Iranian vessel deliberately transmitted false navigational information in an apparent attempt to conceal its movements.
According to the report, GPS signals from Rama III indicated that the ship sailed away from the Gulf and paused briefly near Oman. But satellite imagery taken on November 25 reportedly showed the vessel was not present at the coordinates it had transmitted to surrounding ships.
The discrepancy strongly suggests the vessel was “spoofing”, a deceptive maritime practice in which ships broadcast false location data to disguise their true routes and destinations.
On November 29, satellite images captured a vessel matching the size, shape and appearance of Rama III docked at Iran’s Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas. The same port had been listed in the shipping documents as the final delivery destination for the consignment.
The shipment was consigned to Ertebatat Faragostar Kish (EFK), an Iranian telecommunications company. According to a contract reviewed by the FT, Telesun procured the equipment on behalf of EFK for a project linked to Saman Industrial Group, another Iranian entity.
The US Treasury sanctioned Saman in December 2023, alleging that the company functioned as a commercial front for the Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, the research and development wing responsible for the Guards’ ballistic missile, drone and electronic warfare programmes.
American authorities have accused Saman of helping Iran acquire drone-related technology through intermediary companies operating across multiple jurisdictions. The alleged equipment included antennas, servomotors and other components applicable for unmanned aerial vehicles.
The European Union has also sanctioned the Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, alleging it supplied Iranian drones to Russia.
EFK itself is not currently under Western sanctions.
The shipping agent handling the Iranian side of the transaction was identified in the bill of lading as Blue Calm Marine Services. The US sanctioned the company in 2023, accusing it of facilitating shipments for another entity linked to the Iranian defence ministry’s missile propellant development programme.
Telesun publicly describes itself as a UAE-based supplier of fixed and mobile satellite communication systems across the Middle East and North Africa, providing services ranging from “design to installation & commissioning”.
Neither Telesun nor the UAE foreign ministry responded to questions from the FT regarding the allegations. Iran’s embassy in London also did not respond.
The report adds to growing scrutiny over China-linked technology transfers supporting Iran’s military infrastructure. Last month, the FT separately reported that the IRGC Aerospace Force had secretly acquired a satellite launched by the Chinese company The Earth Eye. The satellite was allegedly used to monitor US military bases and Gulf infrastructure ahead of attacks carried out in March.
Earlier this month, Washington imposed sanctions on The Earth Eye for allegedly supporting Iranian military operations.
“The United States will continue to take action to hold China-based entities accountable for their support to Iran,” the US State Department said. “The targeting of US service members and partners will not go unanswered.”
The disclosures are likely to intensify concerns among Western governments over the use of Gulf commercial hubs and international logistics networks to circumvent sanctions imposed on Iran’s military procurement ecosystem. The revelations may also place renewed pressure on the UAE to tighten oversight of companies operating within its free trade zones amid fears that sensitive military technology continues to flow into Iran despite years of restrictions and monitoring efforts.
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