When a software engineer in his 20s screamed for help last Friday night, marooned in a waterlogged trench near his house in Noida and latching on to his slowly sinking car, there was no shortage of responders to his distress call. His father, the first recipient of the SOS, had immediately informed police, and the nearest patrol team had rushed there. The fire brigade followed. Then came the state disaster response force (SDRF), and ultimately, their national counterparts NDRF.
Eventually, 80 rescuers gathered at the edges of the trench. Yet, Yuvraj Mehta (27), drowned crying his lungs outas he waited to be pulled out. His father Raj Mehta, who could only helplessly watch the bungling operation as rescue teams fumbled with indecision and protocol, told this paper later that his son’s death was the result of an “institutional failure”.
Former UP DGP Vikram Singh told TOI he would describe the Jan 16 night no differently than Raj Mehta. “It’s nothing short of institutional collapse. The victim succumbed to the accident with so many onlookers unable to help them, either due to lack of skill,lack of equipment or lack of bravery,” he said.
By accounts to have emerged so far, Yuvraj, who didn’t know how to swim, managed to stay afloat till around 1.30am, after which his cries for help stopped. The techie had also turned on his phone flashlight and waved it frantically, hoping to catch attention, but on a densely foggy night, that didn’t help.
Rescuers would have had to wade in no more than 50 metres to save him, but no one – except a delivery rider passing by who jumped into the icy cold water and attempted to swim to the techie – did that. Sources involved in the operation have cited two main factors as obstacles – thick fog that made visibility very low and iron rods protruding from submerged pillars in the trench that made wading in treacherous (The trench was dug for a mall basement and left like that for years.
Water came from drain and sewage spill) But far more difficult rescues have been pulled off in much more challenging circumstances. What the tragedy revealed was fundamentalgaps in the emergency rescue mechanism – first responders lacking in both life-saving skill and equipment, agencies operating in silos, and a multilayered escalation matrix that wasted time in making the right assessment and getting the right personnel and the right equipment to the site.
First responders & training gapPolice are always the first to reach the scene of an accident. On Jan 16 night, a police response vehicle (PRV) responding to Raj Mehta’s 112 call at 12.06am, reached the spot in 9 minutes. PRVs have a sub-inspector (SI) or assistant sub-inspector (ASI) and a constable who doubles as driver. Within half an hour of the accident, more personnel from Knowledge Park police station had also reached. The cops attempted the rescue using ropes they threw into the water, hoping Yuvraj – who they could not see because of the fog – would be able to grasp one.
Why did none of them enter the water? Amid public outcry that followed, there have been suggestions from police that the initial responders did not know how to swim.
An official from UP Police Training Academy in Moradabad TOI spoke to said all inspectors,SI- and ASI-level officials are trained in swimming and disaster response.
“First responders at the spot were trained police personnel and I would not like to believe that they said that the water is cold and there is danger. If heat and cold impact them, then they have no business to don the uniform,” said Vikram Singh. “Swimming is part of the police curriculum. Moreover, the point where the accident happened is not in some remote area. Surajpur police lines is only 15km away. Expert swimmers of the police team could have been alerted and they would have come in 15 minutes,” he added.
Former UP DGP OP Singh, who has also served as director-general of NDRF, agreed, saying, “First responders were absolutely unprepared to dive into deep waters, and here, even if personnel had the skill, we saw willingness to jump into the water was not there, which is unfortunate. The delivery boy was ready to jump but first responders were not.”
He added that while police are trained for routineemergencies, this situation demanded more and pointed to a gap in training. “First responders are trained for situations like road accident injury, seizing a car, and so on. But here, there was the adverse condition of a deep waterlogged ditch, combined with fog and cold weather conditions. This demanded more professionally trained personnel, and if the local police had such training, we wouldn’t need relief forces separately.”
Equipment & preparation gap Assuming the first responders were not confident about swimming, why didn’t they carry life jackets?
Dial 112 PRVs are equipped with a standard set of tools – an LED light bar with an integrated speaker, amplifier, high-pitch siren and PA system, rechargeable torches, fire extinguishers, helmets, reflective jackets, ropes, a crime scene protection cordoning kit and a basic first aid kit. A life jacket is not among them.
In cities where civic lapses convert public places into death traps – there have been many accidents in which people have died by falling into open drains and manholes – life jackets should be an integral part of the rescue kit of any first responder.
“A first responder is supposed to be fully geared and that means being equipped with life jackets, life support systems, oxygen cylinders and collapsible boats. If police responders did not have it, it is high time for a rethink and equipping responders with these necessities,” Vikram Singh said.
In big cities, experts pointed out, it’s necessary to raise a specialised emergency response police cell that has divers, welders and firefighters, among others, so that they can mount quick rescue operations before the specialists arrive. “Such teams,”suggested Vikram Singh, “should have not just trained professionals like divers but also hydraulic equipment like cutters or spreaders, breaking tools like specialised saws and medical systems like oxygen supply. Police departments can upgrade their skills to have professional quick response teams.”
Protocols & escalation matrixThe fire brigade reached the accident spot around 45minutes after the accident and NDRF nearly two hours later, bringing the escalation matrix under scrutiny and revealing a response apparatus that had too many silos.
The fire department was evidently not prepared for the rescue either. Officials TOI spoke to emphasised their role is “primarily firefighting and surface rescue”. A fire official admitted that for underwater rescue, diverswould have had to be called from Meerut.
“Fire department personnel are trained to swim, but here, efforts were made to reach the victim by boat because we did not have proper protective gear or masks to go deep into a swamp. The fire department has a basic makeshift boat. We tried to deploy it but because of creepers and the iron rods beneath the swamp, the boat could not move an inch. We also calledthe hydraulic crane used to extinguish fires in highrises and tried a rescue with it, but that failed as well,” a fire official said.
SDRF personnel, trained precisely for such situations, did not dive in either. They, too, decided to use a boat, but from another side of the trench that did not have the iron rods. But there, they had to dig a path to slide the boat into the trench, which took them around two hours.
Shahab Rashid Khan, DIG of Dial 112, told TOI the emergency call at 12.06 am triggered an automated alert for the accident from the main control room. This means information was sent to four agencies – police, fire department, medical services and SDRF. “This is all digital, not manual,” Khan said. “According to SOP, fire, medical and SDRF are informed together. Escalation to NDRF is done later by SDRF, depending on the situation.”
The system did work. It sent out all alerts. But on the ground, precious time slipped. Noida does not have its own SDRF unit. The rescue team was stationed in Ghaziabad 56km away. OP Singh said the escalation matrix followed protocol but exposed a deeper structural problem. “According to protocol, NDRF is to be called in the event of a major emergency. There are only 15 teams of NDRF across the country, so it is obvious they cannot reach everywhere,” he said.
The lesson, according to him, is clear. “It is the need of the hour that states should increase their capacity of relief forces. Police should also be more capable in relief measures. There can be a police cell with personnel trained in rescue operations who are stationed in every district and can reach any spot quickly,” he explained.
A former IAS officer, who served in Delhi and UP, said under the Disaster Management Act, the district magistrate has powers to form a cell with trained personnel who can be dispatched for emergency rescue and relief efforts. “The district disaster management authority (DDMA) has a role here too, to carry out exercises for training and drills and capacity building. They should have proper equipment like fire extinguishers, boats and so on. If DDMAs of each district exercise all powers as mandated by the Act, there is no one stopping them from having a set of trained personnel solely focused on relief and rescue operations.”
TOI reached out to Noida DM Medha Roopam about the preparedness of DDMA and why it wasn’t among the first responders but did not receive a response.
Four agencies, leadership gapAt the accident site in Sector 150 on Jan 16, police, fire services, SDRF and NDRF operated within their respective mandates. Additional CP (lawand order) Rajeev Narayan Mishra said police and fire teams used cranes, ladders, makeshift boats and searchlights, but visibility was extremely poor. An NDRF official said the team had to assess how to safely enter the pit, given depth and visibility constraints.
OP Singh said it’s clear leadership was lacking at the site. “There was no single chain of command. Had a senior official gone and taken charge, there would have been better coordination and quicker response,” he said.
Col Inderjit Singh, who spent 25 years during his Army tenure at several difficult terrains, said Army’s protocol of relief and rescue response in emergencies can be replicated by civilian agencies. “In the Indian Army, we have a nodal point in each region, which is known as a command post. During an emergency, such as a jawan stuck in an avalanche or a vehicle falling into a ditch, the nearest patrol team is activated along with equipment. At the same time, a helicopter at the beck and call of the command post, is always ready to reach a spot within 15-20 minutes,” said Col Singh, adding cities should have a ‘nodal point’ for emergencies that can coordinate with all agencies and give clear instructions. “If the Army can do it, why can’t it be replicated under local police or DDMA? After all, the aim is to save lives,” he said.