Army: How to make Indian army's 'Agnipath' scheme work

The recently announced, but yet to commence, Tour of Duty (ToD) scheme for Indian Army soldiers, under the codename of ‘Agnipath’, has created much debate in the country, particularly among the veterans. As a former soldier, this is my attempt to explain the need for the armed forces to resort to this system, as well as to analyse its advantages and drawbacks.As per reports online, the ToD is usually a stipulated period of time military personnel spend in combat or in a hostile environment. For instance, the soldiers in World War II who were deployed for the entire war were only in active service for four to five years. The American soldiers who served for a shorter duration in Afghanistan or Iraq were also part of ToD.Why does the ministry of defence feel the need to change the present system, which has worked well so far?The urgency arises from the fact that the Army has a burgeoning salaries and pension budget, which routinely comes at the expense of the modernisation of the armed forces. Therefore, something needs to be done to correct the size of the armed forces and reduce its internal expenditure, without it eating from the capital budget that caters for modernisation expenditures. From what we know, the proposal states that 50% of our soldiers should be engaged for three to five years, while the remainder serve for the full pensionable service. (Soldiers who serve for three to five years will not be entitled for pension and thus end up reducing the overall costs.) medium91348805So, what is the problem? Well, the Indian Army is a professional army, which is highly competent and widely respected. Besides guarding the borders and assisting in controlling internal strife and conflict, it is also the last resort of the nation in various situations, ranging from providing services during natural disasters and humanitarian situations to aiding civil services.While the Army may be the instrument of last resort, it is without doubt the first choice of the nation. The very presence of the Army is reassuring to people as well as authorities. Whether it is fighting terrorism and insrugency in J&K or the Northeast, helping control the Jat agitation in 2016, providing relief during Kerala floods, or in establishing the first Covid hospitals, the Army always delivers, no matter how daunting the task.But one must not forget that a significant part of the soldiers are always deployed in combat. The LAC with China, where a massive standoff is underway in Ladakh, and the LoC with Pakistan, which also exports terrorists to India, are both active and unresolved borders that need constant vigil and relentless operations to guard. This requires professional and trained soldiers. Despite a slight quantitative and qualitative (technological) edge over us, we have had the Chinese PLA stalled effectively in Ladakh for the last two years. The Indian Army has been able to hold us in good stead because while we have professional soldiers, about 40% of the Chinese Army is conscripts, with no combat experience. This is also why the mighty Russian Army has not been able to besiege Ukraine, despite the obvious advantages. They too have conscript soldiers, who display inadequate levels of training and motivation, and are not so competent on the ground. During the Vietnam war, the American Army also consisted largely of conscripts, which is why stories of draft dodging abounded. This was one of the major reasons considered for America’s historic defeat in Vietnam, whose soldiers were so highly motivated that they overcame a superior force, despite being low on equipment and funds. In fact, it was after the debacle of US soldiers in Iran hostage rescue around the same time in 1974 when the US decided to discontinue with the practice of compulsory service in their army. medium91348815The other wider concernsIt must be noted that the training and motivation levels of short-term ToD soldiers will remain the same, whether they are compulsory or voluntary. Moreover, soldiers under Agnipath are unlikely to be equipped and appropriate for handling technical arms and services, like say, a radar operator or a helicopter mechanic, as it requires a lot of time and investment to gain such expertise. Hence, the assumption is that the new recruits are likely to be employed for frontline soldiering. However, to be on the frontlines requires a high motivational level, besides excellent professionalism. (Perhaps, they can be more suitable in fields like IT and cyber, in which it may be better to have fresh talent with updated skills every three to five years.)On the other hand, the concerns of inadequacy of the defence budget that has necessitated this thought process are also genuine and need to be addressed. It is imperative, however, to balance it with the need to retain our operational effectiveness. So, as a first step, we must try out a smaller pilot project under Agnipath, and avoid the temptation to fill up the bulk of over 1,30,000 vacancies created due to halting the recruitment, in the last two years due to Covid.Other schemes and methods should also be considered to mitigate the budgetary concerns. Lateral induction of soldiers into Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) after about seven years of service would be ideal. Since it has not found favour with the forces under home ministry, another proposal submitted by the Army is reverse lateral induction, which entails the Army providing the initial training to the personnel selected/recruited by CAPFs, employing them and seasoning them as soldiers for five to seven years and then inducting them in respective forces. This will give trained and experienced soldiers to the CAPFs, afford a support cadre to the army, and mitigate the pension bill.But before we introduce the Agnipath, we should be mindful of the experiences that the three biggest armies in the world have had with short-term duty soldiers. India has two unresolved and active borders with nuclear neighbours and cannot afford to be off balance at any time. We must walk into the Agnipath with our eyes wide open. The writer is a former Lt General who was Corps Commander in Kashmir and retired as Chief of Integrated Defence Staff.The views expressed here are personal.