Indo-China Ties: Out Of The Freezer, Not Warm Yet

The recent visit to New Delhi of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi is a straw in the wind. His meetings with NSA Ajit Doval and external affairs minister S Jaishankar, topped with a call on Modi, all point to a thaw in India-China ties. Additionally, the Chinese side has welcomed Modi’s attendance at the upcoming SCO summit. The needle had begun to shift late last year, a little before the political change in Washington. Recent geopolitical developments appear to be nudging the process further.Disengagement at friction points in border areas has helped. Yet, it is the consensus reached between Modi and Xi in Kazan last Oct that has given impetus to the process of rebuilding ties after the rupture of June 2020.The resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra by Beijing and the decision to grant tourist visas to Chinese nationals by New Delhi have improved mutual perceptions. The agreement on resuming direct flights is also a positive. China has also agreed to share hydrological information during emergency situations in regard to shared rivers. There is a fresh commitment to facilitate trade and investment flows, which could help India divert exports to an alternative market in these trying times. Plus, a successful SCO summit is likely to ensure further multilateral cooperation in fora such as Brics, which India will chair next year and China in 2027. Even as bilateral ties are on the mend, both sides realise that the boundary dispute remains a core issue, which, if not handled properly, has the potential to again derail ties in future. Notably, the two sides have agreed to establish an expert group under the existing Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs to explore “Early harvest in boundary delimitation in the India-China border areas”. They also agreed to set up a working group under the WMCC to “advance effective border management in order to maintain peace and tranquillity in India-China border areas”. Yet another significant agreement pertains to the establishment of “General Level Mechanisms” in the eastern and middle sectors, on the lines of the structured corps commander-level meetings in the western sector, which contributed to the recent turnaround in ties. In the aftermath of Galwan, the focus naturally was on the western sector. But once the military build-up took place on both sides, the middle and eastern sectors also witnessed heightened deployment. There was a stand-off at Yangtse in the eastern sector in Dec 2022. Therefore, a high-level military dialogue for each of the three sectors could prevent future misunderstandings.This underscores the importance attached by both sides to achieving progress in boundary delimitation. The process of clarification and confirmation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) initiated under the confidence building measures (CBMs) agreement fell by the wayside after the initial exchange of maps of the middle sector in 2002. However, China was reluctant to exchange maps on the western and eastern sectors. China’s willingness to move forward now offers an opportunity to revisit the issue with a fresh approach. The key question in the absence of any exchange of large-scale maps for the western and eastern sectors would be to identify and agree upon some areas where the delimitation exercise could begin. The middle sector and Sikkim could be logical options. First, there is clarity about the areas of convergence and divergence in the middle sector since maps have already been exchanged. Second, the external boundaries of Sikkim were settled on the basis of the 1890 Convention and are mutually recognised, barring differences in interpretation at a few places.Effective border management is key. Some CBMs may need improvement. Yet others may need to be fully implemented. This could include improvement and enhancement of communication links, increasing the number of hotlines between forward posts, designating additional meeting points for border personnel meetings, and, revising guidelines to govern conduct in the event of run-ins between patrols. Transparency in building infra in border areas and a firm commitment to desist from unilateral actions to change the status quo in contested areas should also be on the wish list. Regulating patrolling activity to avoid flare-ups would be a priority. Patrolling with prior intimation, avoiding concurrent patrols or conducting joint patrols in certain stretches are some of the options that could be considered. Also, infra already created in forward areas in recent years may have to be dismantled to achieve de-escalation. But this could prove a harder nut to crack. Modi’s forthcoming visit to China is bound to give a fillip to bilateral ties. The 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations had hit a roadblock in 2020. But the 75th anniversary this year is turning out to be different. The writer is former Indian head of the India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group, and is DG, IDSA