Royal Dilemma: India Should Stick To Present Policy On Nepal

Since February 1, when King Gyanendra of Nepal dismissed a party-based government and seized all power, three trends emerged simultaneously: Political power was centralised, the Maoist conflict intensified, and Nepal was put almost at par with other pariah states by the international community. None of these trends has been reversed since the king lifted emergency rule on April 29. Political power is still centralised as none of the governing structures installed by the king after February 1 has been dismantled. The Maoist conflict continues to challenge the government's authority in the vast countryside. And Nepal's foreign friends, despite cautious initial welcome of the lifting of emergency, have yet to decide whether or not to resume assistance to the regime. There is a growing debate, both in Nepal and in India, about the future of military assistance to the regime. The confusing signals emanating out of Delhi on this crucial issue have exposed the sharp policy rifts within Indian government establishment. There is a compelling argument that any military assistance will only lengthen the conflict and bring more hardship to Nepal's people. But just as well, arguments that military supplies are needed to check the Maoists also have serious weight. What is India, as the power most directly linked with Nepal through its open borders, supposed to do in such circumstances? As the lead foreign power in Nepal's affairs, what India does will almost certainly be followed by western powers, including the United States and United Kingdom. Its policy, therefore, holds the key to help resolve or lengthen the conflict in this poor Himalayan kingdom. At just such a crucial time, some influential voices have called for jettisoning the twin-pillar principle that underpins Indian policy in Nepal. The twin pillars denote the monarchy and the mainstream political parties, and how they must both come together to resolve the Maoist conflict peacefully. True, the twin-pillar approach seems tenuous, when one of the pillars, the political parties, is kept out of a power-sharing arrangement. It is equally true that the relaxation of emergency measures is unlikely to impact the prevailing impasse. No matter how much the parties want a reconciliation with the monarchy, they will not settle for anything less than disbanding of the present power set-up. The king is unlikely to bow to such pressures. Yet, abandoning the twin-pillar principle could prove disastrous. The monarch may continue to posit Maoist strength to stretch his acceptability on the international stage. An uninterested, neutral third party — other than India, the US and the UK — might be able to intervene successfully in this situation. India, as the leader of the international coalition on Nepal, can open the way for another party to begin a meaningful process. Meanwhile, there have been suggestions to ignore Nepal's sovereignty and send in a military force to help stabilise the country. If this were to be implemented, India will be making a blunder of Herculean proportions. It will play straight into the hands of the royal government and the Maoist rebels and only help to inflame anti-Indian passions in Nepal. Despite centuries of amicable interaction, there exists a reservoir of deep anti-Indian passion just lurking underneath the tranquil Nepali surface. Much of this can be explained away as the inevitable result of a big country-small country dynamics. But a significant portion of it is due to a sense of inflicted wrongs and heavy handed Indian policies from the past, real or perceived, which has been nurtured by all sides in Nepal's conflict: The Maoists, the Palace and even the political parties. India should do well to step clear of stirring this hornet's nest. That requires continued respect for Nepal's independence and sovereignty, and refraining from using any incendiary language that can only strengthen the anti-democratic and anti-Indian forces in Nepal. Thankfully, India's leaders have continued to stress that point despite opposing voices from non-official sectors. This also means dropping the idea of any military intervention. A military intervention in Nepal, even if the aims are noble, will be hugely counterproductive. It will not only push all Nepalis to unite against "Indian imperialism" but will also provide ammunition for the Maoists and royal regime to advance their political agendas. The Maoists, in fact, have always said that they will be fighting the Indian army. Does India want to prove them right? And this does not even take into account the regional security implications of military adventurism in a strategically situated country that serves as a buffer between India and China. The sensible policy, therefore, would be to eschew any ideas of military intervention and refrain from trampling on Nepal's heightened sense of sovereignty, and to continue with supporting the twin-pillar principle. Despite the fact that the twin-pillar principle has failed to yield any concrete results so far and that both the pillars are as far apart as ever, it is still the most sensible policy. Jettisoning one pillar for the sake of other will not help shorten the conflict; rather it will only prolong it. Continued support for the principle recognises that Nepal's future lies in a true constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy that allows the Maoists to play a peaceful and meaningful role in mainstream politics. Nepal's people want no less. The writer is a commentator on Nepal's politics.