What if Putin imitates Trump and tries a 'Maduro' on Zelenskyy?

When US forces seized Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and transferred him to face charges in the United States, officials in Washington insisted the move was not an act of war. It was law enforcement, they said-an overdue arrest of a criminal who happened to be a head of state.

Driving the news: Operation Absolute Resolve

In the early hours of January 3, 2026, US military forces launched Operation Absolute Resolve, a large-scale strike and special forces raid in Caracas aimed at capturing Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.





The operation, planned over months with intelligence support from US agencies, began with strikes on Venezuelan air defenses and key military sites, clearing a path for elite units like the Army’s Delta Force to breach Maduro’s compound at Fuerte Tiuna. Under heavy fire, American commandos seized the couple, flew them by helicopter to the USS Iwo Jima, and then transported them to the United States, arriving at Stewart Air National Guard Base near New York before moving them into federal custody.

President Donald Trump used the dramatic operation to declare that the US would “run” Venezuela temporarily and touted the seizure as part of a broader effort against drug trafficking and to stabilize the country’s governance, even as global leaders and legal experts raised alarms about sovereignty and the legality of the action under international law.

After Maduro, the unthinkable question

The seizure of Maduro has changed many assumptions about how far major powers may go against leaders they deem illegitimate.

One of the immediate ripple questions in Europe is could Russian President Vladimir Putin attempt something similar against Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

Russia has already tried softer versions of leadership removal in Ukraine, including assassination plots, missile strikes near Kyiv and sustained information campaigns portraying Zelenskyy as illegitimate. None have worked.

The Maduro precedent matters because it lowers a psychological barrier. What once looked unthinkable now looks - at least to some planners - conceivable.

Why it matters

• At stake is not only Ukraine’s leadership but a potential shift in global norms about sovereignty, war and policing.
• If extraterritorial seizure of leaders becomes normalized, the line between law enforcement, regime change and open war blurs - dangerously.
• For Ukraine, Zelenskyy is more than a president. He is the living symbol of national resistance. His removal would be designed to fracture morale and accelerate political collapse.
• For Russia, success would promise a dramatic shortcut after years of costly, grinding warfare.
• For smaller states watching closely, the implication is stark: if great powers treat leaders as snatchable targets, international law offers even thinner protection than before.
• The core question isn’t whether Russia has the capacity to attempt something extreme - it does - but whether the strategic costs would dwarf any conceivable gains.

Between the lines: Why Ukraine is not Venezuela

On paper, a Maduro-style operation looks deceptively simple: locate the leader, penetrate security, extract quickly, present a fait accompli. Ukraine presents almost the opposite conditions.

1. Access is harder

Zelenskyy operates from a fortified, wartime capital. His movements are tightly controlled, protected by layered Ukrainian security services and reinforced by constant intelligence sharing from Western partners. Multiple assassination and capture plots since 2022 have reportedly been foiled, creating a culture of permanent alert.

2. Extraction is riskier

Any Russian attempt to move forces deep into Kyiv - by air, land or covert insertion - would likely be detected quickly. Ukraine’s air defenses, combined with Nato surveillance, make a clean exfiltration scenario highly unlikely. A failed extraction would be a public catastrophe.

3. Consolidation is near impossible

Even if Zelenskyy were seized, Ukraine would not collapse. Power would devolve to constitutional successors, the military chain of command would remain intact and popular resistance would intensify. Unlike Venezuela, Ukraine is fighting an existential war with a mobilized society that already expects sacrifice.

4. Legitimacy cuts the other way

Maduro’s international standing was already weak. Zelenskyy’s is not. A Russian move against him would almost certainly harden Western support - more weapons, more money and fewer restraints on how Ukraine uses them.

The paradox: The more symbolically valuable Zelenskyy is, the less strategically useful his removal becomes.

The big picture

A Maduro-style operation succeeds only if three conditions align: surprise, deniability and a political vacuum afterward. Ukraine offers none of the three.

Surprise is blunted by intelligence saturation.

Deniability collapses the moment Kyiv, Washington or Brussels produces evidence - which they almost certainly would.

A political vacuum does not exist in a country already organized for national survival.

For Putin, the downside scenarios are grim:

• Failure: an exposed plot becomes proof of Russian desperation, strengthening Ukrainian unity and Western resolve.
• Partial success: Zelenskyy is killed or captured, but Ukraine fights on - now with a martyr and fewer constraints on escalation.
• “Success”: Zelenskyy is removed and a puppet authority is declared, instantly rejected by Ukrainians and most of the world, forcing Russia into deeper, costlier occupation.
• In every case, the operation accelerates outcomes Moscow wants to avoid: tighter Western alignment, more advanced weapons flowing to Ukraine and a war framed even more starkly as authoritarian aggression versus national self-defense.

What's next

The Maduro precedent does alter strategic imagination. Leaders and security services everywhere will now plan for scenarios once dismissed as taboo. Zelenskyy’s protection will tighten further, and other wartime leaders will quietly reassess their own vulnerabilities.

But for Russia, the lesson is likely caution rather than imitation. The US could attempt a Maduro-style seizure from a position of overwhelming global reach, geographic distance and relative insulation from immediate retaliation. Russia, fighting a grinding war on its own border, enjoys none of those buffers.

Bottom line

Putin could try a Maduro on Zelenskyy. But trying is the easy part. Living with the consequences is another matter entirely - and that is why, despite the precedent, such a move remains far more likely to stay in the realm of speculation than execution.

(With inputs from agencies)